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DRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE GREENMAIL PROHIBITION
RonaldJ. Gilson*
Hostile tender offers have become a recurrent political issue. In
recent years Congress has held seemingly endless hearings on the subject, and by now the testimony has settled into a familiar dialogue. Potential acquirers cast themselves as the embodiment of Adam Smith's
invisible hand-their activities energize the market for corporate control with the desirable result of improving the efficiency of corporate
management. Management of potential targets, in turn, claim the role
of Albert Chandler's visible hand-efficient managers who internalize a
function previously carried out by an inefficient market.' Their argument is that because the market for corporate control systematically understates companies' intrinsic values, managers must displace the
market to prevent underpriced acquisitions.
Although the terms of the debate are cast in the language of efficiency, as with most serious political issues, much of the real substance
is distributional. Even those who genuinely believe that hostile takeovers improve allocative efficiency will concede that some groups still
suffer in the process. Their point goes no further than the claim that,
after netting out the gains (to, for example, target shareholders) and
the losses (to, for example, laid-off middle management and local
communities), hostile takeovers still yield a positive result. A substantial amount of the conflict in Congress, as well as within and between
states, is over who reaps the gains and who bears the costs of takeovers,
2
whatever their net social impact.
Out of this political maelstrom, one element of virtual consensus
has emerged: greenmail- target management paying a potential ac* Professor of Law, Stanford University. The research for this essay was supported
by a bequest from the Claire and Michael Brown Estate. I am grateful to Richard

Buxbaum for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. A. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Busi-

ness (1977).
2. This suggests that efforts by states to restrict hostile takeovers reflect the fact
that, in those states, the potential injury to domestic interests from hostile takeovers
through plant closings, relocation of executive offices, the loss ofjobs and the like, exceeds the potential gain to domestic shareholders and the overall positive impact on the

state from improved economic efficiency resulting from an active market for corporate
control. See R. Gilson, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 1059-60
(1986); Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111,
138-41 (1987). Then-Professor Lehn and ProfessorJones provide some empirical support for this thesis. Their study shows that the location of target firms' headquarters was
highly correlated with a Senator's introduction of federal antitakeover legislation. K.
Lehn & J. Jones, The Legislative Politics of Hostile Corporate Takeovers 22 (Mar. 19,

1987) (paper presented at a Conference in Political Economy and Business, Washington
University, St. Louis, Mo.)
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quirer to go away by repurchasing his shares at a premium-is bad.a
Given the terms of the political debate, it is not surprising that broad
support has developed for prohibiting greenmail. It is the only aspect
of the hostile takeover phenomenon that is seen as a threat by both
sides of the debate. From the perspective of the protakeover forces,
greenmail is just another, albeit more blatant, technique by which
target management entrenches itself at the expense of target shareholders. Prohibiting the payment at least eliminates this form of en3. The consensus is not, however, complete. Some managers simply resist any reduction in the range of available defensive responses to hostile takeovers. Warranting
more serious attention, however, are two types of progreenmail arguments-conceptual
and empirical-advanced by academic advocates. The conceptual argument, best stated
by Professors Schliefer and Vishny, is based on a model in which paying greenmail may
serve as a credible signal to potential alternative bidders that an opportunity is available
that warrants attention. From this perspective, attracting competitive bidding is desirable because it results in a higher price. In addition to the information content of the
greenmail payment, the argument runs, the greenmail payment eliminates the initial
bidder who, because of its existing low cost stake in the target, would be at a significant
competitive advantage in any bidding contest. Rather than preventing the target's takeover, in this view eliminating the initial bidder by paying greenmail is necessary to cause
a takeover to occur at a more favorable price. Schliefer & Vishny, Greenmail, White
Knights, and Shareholders' Interest, 17 RandJ. Econ. 293 (1986).
The difficulty with this model is that it does not take into account the conflict of
interest between management and shareholders. Even if greenmail can serve the purpose of attracting competitive bids, it still can be used by less loyal management as a
defensive tactic. The upshot is that, unless we can devise a means to distinguish "good"
from "bad" greenmail, the value of greenmail depends on its overall impact across all
cases in which it is paid, a pooling equilibrium problem.
This is where the empirical argument comes in. The claim, made most directly by
Professors Macey and McChesney, is that aggregating the results in all cases in which
greenmail is paid yields a net increase in target shareholder wealth. They note that the
drop in share value on the announcement of a greenmail payment does not offset all of
the increase in share value on the announcement of the potential acquirer's initial investment. The net increase, they argue, shows that the overall impact of greenmail is
positive. Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 Yale
LJ. 13 (1985). For a discussion of the empirical studies on which the argument is based,
see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
I have responded to this argument elsewhere by predicting that all of this gain will
disappear if the company that paid greenmail is not subsequently taken over. R. Gilson,
supra note 2, at 736-38 (1986). The next generation of empirical studies confirms this
prediction. These studies show that, on a portfolio basis, the net gain that remains after
a greenmail payment disappears in the absence of a subsequent successful bid (although
some companies retain their gains). Mikkelson & Ruback, Targeted Share Repurchases
and Common Stock Returns 29 (Sloan School of Management Working Paper No. 170786, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyJune 1986), and Bhagat &Jefferis, Why Good
Managers Pay Greenmail: The Economics of Targeted Share Repurchases 51-53 (University of Utah Graduate School of Business Working Paper, Sept. 1986). Those firms
that are rapidly taken over by other bidders may have benefited from paying greenmail,
but this still must be balanced against those firms whose higher share price is completely
dissipated, leaving the greenmail payment as a loss to shareholders. Thus, we are left
where we started-without the ability generally to distinguish good greenmail from bad
greenmail. In this setting, the best approach may be to prohibit greenmail, leaving to
shareholders the power to authorize its payment in specific cases.
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trenchment. From the perspective of the antitakeover forces,
greenmailers are the worst example of exploitive, opportunistic players
in the market for corporate control, threatening an acquisition that has
no efficiency justification (and may impose significant costs) simply to
gamer short-term gains. Prohibiting the payment eliminates the incentive to engage in such exploitive activity in the first place. The unique
overlap of interests means that both sides can agree on one aspect of
takeover reform: greenmail should be prohibited.
My purpose here is not to debate that conclusion but to comment
on the more prosaic yet nonetheless pressing problem of how to implement a prohibition on greenmail. Some states already have adopted
legislative prohibitions, 4 and the takeover legislation now pending in
Congress also would prohibit the practice. 5 Additionally, a significant
number of corporations have not waited for legislative action, instead
adopting charter amendments that prohibit the individual corporation
from paying greenmail. 6 The problem is that the efforts to date to prohibit greenmail are seriously underinclusive because they misunderstand the problem. Indeed, I will make the stronger claim that, rather
than prohibiting greenmail, existing and proposed prohibitions in fact
serve to legalize greenmail by creating a safe harbor within which it
safely can be paid.
Part I of this essay describes the necessary components of any
greenmail prohibition, illustrates their relevance to the twin goals of
4. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-1204 (Supp. 1987); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.553,
subdivision 3 (West 1987); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 463.512-.516 (Michie 1987); N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 513(e) (McKinney 1986); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 180.725(5) (West 1987).
5. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 8, 133 Cong. Rec. 7601-02 (1987)
(Proxmire chief sponsor); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1987) (Dingell and
Markey chief sponsors); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 10, 133 Cong. Rec.

7668-69 (1987) (Sanford sole sponsor).
Judicial doctrine has never posed a serious threat to greenmail. Provided a record

was made, review of directors' action in authorizing the repurchase was reviewed under
the deferential business judgment rule, with predictable results. See, e.g., Heine v. The
Signal Companies, 1976-77 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Cheffv.
Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 508, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (1964). The move in Delaware toward
an intermediate standard of review of defensive tactics, see R. Gilson, The Law and

Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 110-21 (Supp. 1987), as yet seems not to have resulted in increased scrutiny of greenmail. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536-37 (Del.

1986). Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court's analysis in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985), explicitly relied on the fact that greenmail
could be paid in concluding that reverse greenmail-a purchase from all shareholders
except the potential acquirer-was also lawful.
The one flash of more stringent review is Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d
119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985), where the court affirmed a preliminary injunction barring a greenmail payment by Disney to Saul Steinberg.
6. Between 1984 and February 1987, some 70 publicly traded corporations, including, for example, Alcoa, Anheuser-Busch, B.F. Goodrich, Mobil and NYNEX, amended

their articles of incorporation to add a prohibition of greenmail. Jaenicke, Greenmail:
Background Report B, Investor Responsibility Research Center, Corporate Governance
Service B-12 (Feb. 1987).
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preventing exploitation and management entrenchment, and emphasizes the critical role of the definition of a premium. Drawing on a substantial body of empirical research describing the impact on the price of
a target company's stock of the announcement both of an initial investment by a potential acquirer and of the repurchase of that investor's
stock, this part demonstrates that what has been the most common approach to defining a premium-prohibiting only greenmail payments
that exceed market price at the time of repurchase-is likely to be ineffective and at best serves only as a price control. Part II then evaluates
three alternative definitions of a greenmail premium that do not present this critical problem. It concludes that equating a premium with the
existence of investor profit is problematic, that direct statistical measurement of a greenmail premium is feasible, and that a market-based
measure that identifies greenmail by the market's response to a stock
repurchase may be the most effective approach of all. Finally, Part III
describes how a greenmail prohibition can overcome two general objections to a legislative prohibition: that it can always be avoided and
that a legislative prohibition is inferior to a private ordering solution.
I. THE NECESSARY COMPONENTS OF A GREENMAIL PROHIBITION:
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF A PREMIUM

The standard greenmail prohibition bars, without shareholder approval, the non-pro rata premium repurchase of a substantial amount
of stock from a short-term holder. 7 Each component of the prohibition-non-pro rata, substantial amount, short term, and premium-is
designed to distinguish transactions that present the risk of greenmail
from repurchase transactions that either serve valid corporate purposes
not involving control, or that, whether desirable from other perspectives, do not present the risk of greenmail 8
7. An example is the New York statute, whose substantive terms read as follows:
(e) No resident domestic corporation which is subject to the provisions of
section nine hundred twelve of this chapter shall purchase or agree to purchase
more than ten percent of the stock of the resident domestic corporation from a
shareholder for more than the market value thereof unless such purchase or
agreement to purchase is approved by the affirmative vote of the board of directors followed by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon at a meeting of shareholders unless the
certificate of incorporation requires a greater percentage of the outstanding
shares to approve.
The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply when the resident domestic corporation offers to purchase shares from all holders of stock or for stock
which the holder has been the beneficial owner of for more than two years.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Act § 513(e) (McKinney 1986).

8. The shareholder approval requirement, by contrast, gives shareholders the option of authorizing what is explicitly a greenmail payment if they so elect.
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A. The Non-Pro Rata Component
The explanation for limiting the prohibition to non-pro rata repurchases is inherent in the reasons for prohibiting greenmail in the first
place. With respect to the exploitation concern, unless the opportunistic investor is favored over other shareholders, he has no special incentive to give up the threatened offer or to make the investment in the
first place. To be sure, a potential acquirer who forces the target company to restructure to defeat his offer 9 may still stand to gain a great
deal, and that may provide an incentive to make the initial investment.
But a potential acquirer following this strategy can profit only if all
other shareholders profit. As a result, there is little risk of the opportunistic, exploitive strategies that motivate the antitakeover forces' opposition to greenmail. With respect to the entrenchment concern of
protakeover forces, pro rata repurchases cannot dissipate a sizeable
toehold investment, because the participation of other shareholders in
the repurchase would cause the potential acquirer to remain a substantial shareholder. Thus, a pro rata repurchase generally does not have
the entrenchment effect that motivates the protakeover forces' support
for a greenmail prohibition.' 0
Excluding pro rata repurchases from the repurchase prohibition
also avoids imposing unintended restrictions on other corporate finance techniques that do' not raise control issues. A pro rata repurchase has the same financial effect as a dividend, and there is no
corporate governance reason for preferring one method of distributing
corporate earnings to another."
B. The SubstantialAmount of Stock and Short-Term Holder Components
The substantial amount of stock and short-term holder components also operate to exclude from the prohibition transactions that do
9. See, e.g., Lederman & Goroff, Recapitalization Transactions, 14 Rev. Sec. &

Commodities Reg. 241 (1986).
10. That is not to say that pro rata repurchases cannot have an entrenchment effect.

If both the repurchase and management's prerepurchase holdings are large enough, a
pro rata repurchase in which management chooses not to participate can increase management's stake to the point where they have effective voting control. See, e.g., Nathan
& Sobel, Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35

Bus. Law. 1545 (1980). A dual class recapitalization effected by an exchange offer operates to entrench management in the same manner. See Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class
Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 807, 812-13 (1987).
This aspect of the entrenchment effect of target stock repurchases raises concerns
over the standard governing defensive tactics generally, rather than undermining the

political consensus favoring the prohibition of the particular form of entrenchmenteliminating a specific potential bidder-resulting from greenmail.
11. Indeed, most modem state corporation statutes approach the regulation of dis-

tributions by explicitly treating repurchases and dividends as functional equivalents.
See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 166 (West Supp. 1987); Model Business Corp. Act Ann.

§ 6.40 comment 1 (1987).
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not pose the risk of greenmail. However, they are not equally responsive to the two concerns, entrenchment and exploitation, whose convergence explains the political consensus supporting the prohibition.
Moreover, drafting definitions of these two components is much
less straightforward than distinguishing pro rata from non-pro rata
payments.
1. ConceptualAnalysis. - Restricting the prohibition to repurchases
of substantial amounts of stock 12 recognizes that, unless a substantial
number of shares are held, exploitive behavior of the sort feared by the
antitakeover forces is an unlikely strategy because the implicit threat is
too weak and the potential gain from the transaction too small. Similarly, unless the repurchase is substantial, there is little risk of management entrenchment because control of the company is unlikely to be
13
affected by an insubstantial repurchase.
Like the non-pro rata requirement, the substantial amount limitation operates to exclude from the prohibition some repurchase transactions that serve traditional corporate purposes. For example,
companies often undertake premium repurchases limited to holders of
odd lots to reduce shareholder-related expenses, like distribution of
proxy material and annual and quarterly reports, that are a function of
the number of shareholders rather than the number of shares owned.
Without a substantial amount limitation, the prohibition would include
such repurchases because they are not pro rata. Similarly, in executing
a repurchase program for general corporate purposes,' 4 it may be
12. Existing state greenmail prohibitions are limited to repurchases involving holders of at least 5 to 10% of a corporation's outstanding shares. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 101204A (Supp. 1987) (5% of shares); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.553, subdivision 3 (West
1987) (5% of shares); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513(e) (McKinney 1986) (10% of shares);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.725 (West 1987) (3% of shares). The Nevada statute specifies no
percentage as it merely authorizes administrative rulemaking regarding greenmail. Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 463.512-.516 (Michie 1987). The proposed federal statutes generally have lower thresholds. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8, 133 Cong. Rec.
7601, 7602 (1987) (Proxmire: 3% of any class of securities); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5 (1987) (Dingell-Markey: 3% of shares); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 10, 133 Cong. Rec. 7668, 7669 (1987) (Sanford: 2.5% of shares).
13. Form versus substance problems could be raised here. Suppose a potential acquirer owned 10% of the target company's outstanding stock. To avoid the substantial
amount component of the prohibition, a greenmail transaction might be structured as a
repurchase of only 1%, but at a premium of a size that would have been associated with
repurchase of the entire block. In turn, the seller would either sign a standstill agreement or simultaneously sell the remainder of his stock in the market. For a consideration of the general problem of form versus substance-transactions carefully crafted to
avoid violating the form of the prohibition while still transgressing its substance-in
connection with efforts to prohibit greenmail, see infra notes 51-57 and accompanying
text.
14. Typical explanations for such programs include acquiring shares so that acquisitions and stock option plans can be carried out without diluting existing shareholders,
as well as the belief that the shares are underpriced so that they represent a good investment. Put differently, and more consistently with an informationally efficient stock mar-
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cheaper to purchase blocks of stock from existing holders at a premium
than to make market purchases or a pro rata offer. 15 So long as the
amounts repurchased are not in the aggregate substantial, such repurchases fall outside the prohibition.
Limiting the repurchase prohibition only to short-term holders 16
also seeks to exclude transactions that do not pose the risk of greenmail. However, unlike the substantial amount limitation, this approach
looks largely to the exploitation concern of the antitakeover forces and
not to the entrenchment concern of the protakeover forces. To prevent
exploitation, the short-term holder component imposes a holding period that must be satisfied before shares may be resold to the company
at a premium. Here, as in other regulatory regimes where a holding
period is imposed,1 7 the need to hold an investment subject to market
risk for a significant period of time reduces the likelihood that the investor has an exploitive motive in making the investment by increasing
the costs of such a strategy.1 8
In contrast, the short-term holder component speaks far less directly and effectively to the management entrenchment aspect of the
consensus supporting the prohibition of greenmail. From this perspective, buying off a long-term shareholder presents precisely the same entrenchment concern as buying off a short-term holder. There is no
particular reason to believe that a long-term holder might not turn out
ket, the repurchase credibly signals that management possesses favorable private
information bearing on the value of the company's stock.
15. News leaks of the market purchases may drive up the price of the stock more
than the premium to be paid or, indeed, because of blockage-the difficulty of disposing
of a large amount of stock-a block of stock may be acquired with no premium at all.
With respect to the alternative of pro rata offers, the cost advantage of block purchases
is avoidance of the costs of compliance with SEC rules governing issuer repurchases.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1, -3 to -4, -100 to -101 (1987).
16. Existing state statutes regulate repurchases involving shares held from two to
three years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-1204A (Supp. 1987) (shares held under three
years); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302 A.553, subdivision 3 (West 1987) (six months); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Act § 513(e) (McKinney 1986) (two years); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.725(5) (West
1987) (two years). The Nevada statute merely authorizes administrative rulemaking,
and hence specifies no holding period. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 463.512-.516 (Michie
1987). Proposed federal legislation generally is limited to shares held for shorter periods. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8, 133 Cong. Rec. 7601-02 (1987) (Proxmire
bill: six months); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5 (1987) (Dingell-Markey: two
years); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10, 133 Cong. Rec. 7668-69 (1987)
(Sanford: one year).
17. Both Rules 144 and 145 under the Securities Act of 1933 use the requirement
of a holding period before resale of securities acquired, respectively, in a private offering
and by certain persons in an acquisition as a basis for their exclusion from these rules'
restrictions. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144d-1 (1987) (seller of restricted securities held more
than two years not regulated as an underwriter); 17 C.F.R. § 230.145d (1987) (seller of
securities relating to acquisition, reclassification, merger or consolidation and held more
than three years not an underwriter).
18. The preliminary note to SEC Rule 144 under the 1933 Act states this policy
expressly. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1987).
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to be a potential acquirer.' 9
Thus, a greenmail prohibition that was equally concerned with exploitation and entrenchment concerns would treat long- and short-term
shareholders identically. The antiacquisition forces' concern about exploitation would justify restricting non-pro rata premium repurchases
from short-term holders, and the proacquisition forces' concern about
entrenchment would justify restricting non-pro rata premium repurchases from long-term holders. However, given that the political balance with respect to greenmail favors antitakeover forces, viable
legislation is nonetheless likely to include a short-term holder
component.
2. Drafting Difficulties. - There is a serious problem in reducing the
concepts underlying the substantial amount and short-term holder
components to operative language. The adjectives "substantial" and
"short-term" lack precision; a party seeking to comply with a prohibition framed in those terms would confront significant uncertainty over
whether a particular transaction was covered. For example, without
more guidance the conceptual underpinnings of these components do
not allow one to resolve with confidence whether a four percent repurchase involves a substantial amount of stock, or whether someone who
has held stock for six months is a short-term holder.
Nor is there an easy way out of the problem. As a matter of administrative convenience, it is easy enough to specify a precise triggering
percentage or minimum holding period. The problem is that any line
chosen is necessarily arbitrary-it is difficult to imagine a reasoned distinction between repurchases of four percent and five percent or between six-month or seven-month holders. And precisely because any
line would be arbitrary, the very drawing of one invites conduct that,
although substantively of the sort intended to be prohibited, has been
designed to fall just on the other side.
This quandary reflects a general problem in regulatory drafting.
The more specific a prohibition, the less likely it is unintentionally to
deter socially desirable activity. Uncertainty whether a particular activity is covered by the prohibition deters that activity; specificity, because
it reduces the uncertainty as to coverage, limits the unintended deterrence. The reduction in uncertainty, however, comes at a price. The
more specific the prohibition, the more likely it is that undesirable behavior, intended to be prohibited, can be structured to fall outside the
19. To be sure, nongreenmail justifications can be offered for non-pro rata premium repurchases from long-term holders. But these reveal a control-related motive on
their face. Thus, management may wish to prevent such large blocks of stock from possibly being acquired by raiders in a future takeover contest. This desire to keep the
stock from falling into "the wrong hands" has an obvious entrenchment effect. Exploitation, by contrast, is not at issue, for management has no fear that the long-term
shareholders themselves will engage in exploitive behavior.
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prohibition. 20
Resolution of this drafting dilemma would require balancing the
amount and desirability of the conduct unintentionally deterred by too
general a formulation against the amount and undesirability of the conduct unintentionally sanctioned by too specific a formulation. In the
greenmail context, the relevant balance would compare, among other
things, the amount of greenmail that a precise, relatively high specification of the substantial amount concept would allow to slip through with
the justifiable repurchases for general corporate purposes that would
combe prevented (or made more expensive) if the substantial 2amount
1
ponent was left more general (or made precise but low).

One way around the underinclusive/overinclusive dilemma in the
greenmail context would be to use the final component of the prohibition-that the repurchase be at a premium-to differentiate between
desirable and undesirable transactions more precisely, but without the
underinclusiveness that precision typically causes due to efforts to cast
transactions so that they just avoid the precise boundaries set. Among
other benefits, such a solution would take some of the pressure off the
formulation of the substantial amount and short-term holder components. These components then could be drafted so that they swept
broadly, relying on the precision of the final component to ameliorate
any overinclusiveness. At the same time, the premium component is
important in its own right because it focuses on the most critical element in both conceptions-exploitation and entrenchment-of the
danger of greenmail: the potential acquirer's profit from the repurchase. Thus, the premium component has both derived and direct
importance.
20. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal

Stud. 257 (1974). For an examination of this regulatory dilemma in a different corporate context, see Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 882-87 (1981).

21. The trade-off would be speculative on both sides. All that would be lost by an
overinclusive formulation would be access to certain repurchase techniques-non-pro

rata block purchases-that are claimed to be cheaper, for example, because not subject
to the issuer tender offer rules under section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. 78m (Supp. IV 1987), than the alternatives, like a pro rata offer, that
would remain available. I am not aware of any data that indicates the frequency of use
or the cost differential in favor of techniques that would be foreclosed by an overinclusive formulation. Nor is there any way to tell how much greenmail would take place with
an underinclusive formulation where the trigger amount was set precisely and at a high
figure. Data concerning the size of past greenmail transactions that took place in an
unregulated market would not indicate whether smaller transactions would take place
once a prohibition of a specified size transaction was in place. So, for example, the fact
that most significant greenmail purchases have involved more than 57o of the company's
stock in fact may demonstrate only that a prohibition set at 5% will result in greenmail
purchases of 4.9%.
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C. The Premium Component: The Core of the Prohibition
The core of an antigreenmail prohibition is the requirement that
the repurchase be at a premium. With respect to the fear of exploitation, unless a premium is paid, there is no incentive for an opportunistic investor to pursue a greenmail strategy in the first place. With
respect to the fear of entrenchment, unless a premium is paid, there is
little incentive for a potential acquirer to abandon an otherwise intended hostile offer, and therefore little risk that the repurchase will
entrench management. As a result, the premium definition has the potential to take the pressure off the formulation of the substantial
amount and short-term holder components. Any overinclusiveness of
the formulation of these components may be mitigated by the additional requirement that a premium be paid. Moreover, the presence or
absence of a premium contemplates a dichotomy rather than the continuum of the substantiality and short-term components. This component thus holds out the promise of precision that is neither under nor
overinclusive.
This happy result depends, of course, on how the term "premium"
is defined. The most common formulation of a greenmail prohibition
takes the straightforward but, in the end, naive view that a repurchase
at a premium is one at a price above the prevailing market price for the
stock at the time of the repurchase. 22 This market-price measure of a
premium has the advantage of being both precise and readily determinable. It reflects, however, a misunderstanding of the economics of the
greenmail process and, as a result, is seriously underinclusive. Because
the market price at the time of the repurchase already incorporates a
premium for the greenmailer, a market-price measure of the existence
of a premium does no more than set a ceiling--a form of price control-on the amount of greenmail that can be paid. Within this safe
harbor, greenmail, in effect, is legalized.
To see this requires review of the empirical evidence concerning
the impact on the price of a company's stock when a potential acquirer
announces that it has made a significant investment in the company
and, subsequently, when the company announces that it has purchased
that investment. All existing studies display a consistent pattern. On
the announcement of the investment, the stock's price increases significantly,2 3 and the increase is particularly pronounced when the an22. The New York statute takes this approach, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513(e)

(McKinney 1986), as does the Dingell-Markey House bill, H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5 (1987).
23. Holderness & Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial
Investors, 14J. Fin. Econ. 555, 563 (1985); Mikkelson & Ruback, Corporate Investments

in Common Stock (Sloan School of Management Working Paper No. 1633-85, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Feb. 1985). Technically, the studies show positive abnormal returns, not simple price changes. For an explanation of the difference, see infra
note 39.
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nouncement states that the potential acquirer is considering additional
purchases of the company's stock.2 4 Empirical studies also uniformly
show that the price of the company's stock decreases sharply following
the announcement that the company has purchased the potential acthe comquirer's stock, 25 and that the entire original increase is lost if 26
pany is not subsequently the subject of a successful takeover.
For our purposes, the critical point is that the market price of the
company's stock on the date of the repurchase has already increased
because, as a result of announcement of the initial investment, the market anticipates that a takeover may take place. Payment to the potential
acquirer of that increased market price reflects precisely the premium
that defines greenmail, a fact strikingly demonstrated by the drop in
stock price that follows announcement of the repurchase.
The current crop of proposed federal greenmail prohibitions 27 do
seem to recognize a part of the problem, but the solutions adopted are
inadequate. Attempting to pick up some of the price increase that follows announcement of the initial investment, these proposals define the
premium component of the prohibition as a price above market price,
but then define market price as the average price of the company's
stock over the thirty days prior to the repurchase. 28 As the time between the announcement of the initial investment and the repurchase
increases, however, the averaging formula recaptures less and less of
the premium implicit in the post-announcement price. For example, if
the repurchase occurs fifteen days after the announcement of the initial
investment, then half of the days counted in the average include a postannouncement premium. At the limit, if the repurchase takes place
more than thirty days after announcement of the initial investment, so
that the market price of the company's stock has reflected the increase
thirty-day period, the
in price from the announcement over the entire
29
averaging formula will have no impact at all.
24. Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 23, at Table 4.
25. Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Impact of Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on Stock Prices 9 (Sept. 11, 1984);
Bradley & Wakeman, The Wealth Effects of Targeted Share Repurchases, 11 J. Fin.
Econ. 301, 308 (1983); Dann & DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated
Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 275, 294
(1983); Holderness & Sheehan, supra note 23; Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 23.
26. Bhagat &Jefferis, supra note 3, at 45; Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 3, at 29.
27. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 8, 133 Cong. Rec. 7601-02 (1987)
(Proxmire chief sponsor); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1987) (Dingell and

Markey chief sponsors); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10, 133 Cong. Rec.
7668-69 (1987) (Sanford sole sponsor).
28. The Arizona and Minnesota statutes also use a thirty-day averaging approach to
determine market price. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § I0-1204B (Supp. 1987); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 302A.553, subdivision 3 (West 1987).

29. This result is even more pronounced when the potential acquirer actually has
made a tender offer for the company's stock. Then the market price of the stock will
have increased to reflect not just the increased probability that an offer will be made, but
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Thus, while a precise definition of a greenmail premium is both
important in itself and relieves pressure on the inherently imprecise
substantial amount and short-term holder components, a market-price
measure of this premium is inadequate. The market price at the time of
repurchase already incorporates a premium, so this measure is itself
seriously underinclusive. What is needed is a definition of a premium
that takes into account the stock price rise that results from the announcement of the potential acquirer's initial investment.
II.

THREE APPROACHES TO DEFINING A PREMIUM

Three different solutions to the problem of a post-announcement
price increase are possible: the use of investor profit as a proxy for the
existence of premium; a direct statistical measure of the existence and
size of a premium that accounts for the announcement effect; and an
end run around the problem by using a measure that, in effect, allows
the market to determine whether a premium was paid.
A. A Profit-Based Definition of a Premium
The problem with the standard market-price definition of a premium is that it is underinclusive-the premium implicit in the market
price is ignored. One solution to the underinclusiveness problem uses
the presence of investor profits as a proxy for the payment of a premium. By analogy to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,30 which uses trading profit as a proxy for a different form of illicit
gain (from trading on inside information), this approach defines a premium as any price in excess of what the otherwise covered investorone who is selling a substantial amount of stock not held for the requisite period-paid for the stock to be repurchased.3 1 Thus, if a potential
also the terms of the offer on the table. The Proxmire bill copes with this problem by
specifying that when the person from whom the repurchase is made has commenced a
tender offer or announced an intention to seek control of the company, market price is
measured over the thirty trading days preceding the commencement of the offer or the
announcement of the intent. S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8h(l), 133 Cong. Rec.
7601-02 (1987); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10, 133 Cong. Rec. 7668-69
(1987) (Sanford bill with similar provision). Dingell-Markey does not deal with this
problem. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 10 (1987).
An unsystematic review of a number of corporate charter prohibitions suggests that
a simple market price measure of the existence of a premium, as found in DingellMarkey, is the most common approach taken by voluntary efforts to prohibit greenmail.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1981). Under section 16(b), all profits earned by an officer,
director or 10% shareholder from the purchase and sale of an issuer's equity securities
within a six-month period are recoverable by the issuer.
31. For an example of this approach in a charter amendment prohibition, see Proxy
Statement of The Perkin-Elmer Corporation 18 (Oct. 12, 1984). Mobil Corporation
took the point one step further by eliminating the premium requirement entirely. Proxy
Statement of The Mobil Corporation A-7 (Feb. 22, 1985).
Congress recently took this approach in the Revenue Act of 1987, Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. X, § 10228, adding section 5881 to
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acquirer buys a substantial amount of stock at ten dollars per share, and
the company repurchases it shortly thereafter on a non-pro rata basis
for fifteen dollars, the five dollar profit is treated as an illegal premium.
A profit-based definition of a premium has two advantages. First,
it clearly remedies the underinclusiveness problem of a simple marketprice definition; in most situations, a premium will result in a profit,
and there is little risk that transactions intended to be prohibited will
slip through the cracks. 3 2 Second, a profit-based approach has the advantage of ease of application. A bright-line, readily observable rule
makes it easy to know in advance when a repurchase would be
prohibited.
Like most bright-line prophylactic rules, however, the avoidance of
underinclusiveness (and the ease of application) comes at the cost of
potential overinclusiveness-some transactions may be covered that do
not pose the twin risks of exploitation and entrenchment that motivate
prohibiting greenmail. For example, if the price of a company's stock
has been rising, a profit-based definition of a premium would prohibit
purchases made as part of a general repurchase program from holders
who have held too much stock for too short a time-for example, institutional investors- otherwise to be excluded from the prohibition by
the substantial amount or short-term holder components.
To be sure, this overinclusiveness could be mitigated by tightening
the terms of the other components of the prohibition:3 3 by decreasing
the holding period or increasing the size of the triggering amount. But
solving the overinclusiveness of a profit-based definition by altering the
coverage of the other components eliminates one of the factors that
make the premium component so important to the drafting exercise.
Recall that one of the hopes for the premium component is that its
expected precision will relieve the pressure on the definitions of the
the Internal Revenue Code. Section 5881 imposes a 50%o tax on the profit realized from

the receipt of greenmail, defined as consideration transferred by a corporation to acquire its stock from any shareholder who has held the stock less than 2 years and who
has made or threatened to make a tender offer for the stock of the corporation, unless
the acquisition is pursuant to an offer made on the same terms to all shareholders.

32. Some underinclusiveness nonetheless remains. One situation that a profitbased definition would not cover is that in which the price of the stock has declined and
the premium-the amount above market price-does not exceed the decline. This
problem is solved by the direct statistical measure of a premium considered infra notes
35-41 and accompanying text. For example, consider stock purchased initially at $10
per share, whose market price declines to $5 per share, and which is repurchased on a
non-pro rata basis at $8 per share. The $3 premium is not captured, because no profit
was made on the original stock purchase-in fact, a $2 loss occurred.
33. Section 16(b), which by its terms applies to all insider equity transactions com-

pleted within six months, has even more obvious overinclusiveness problems. These
have been mitigated by Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, see 17 C.F.R.
240.16b (1987), and by judicial decision, see, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 (1973) (section 16b directed only at transactions
that could not serve as vehicles for trading on inside information).
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substantial amount and holding period requirements that result from
their necessarily arbitrary (and therefore unavoidably under or overinclusive) nature. It is hardly a step forward, then, to turn to these components as a means of solving the overinclusiveness of a profit-based
34
measure of the premium component.
B. A Direct Statistical Definition of a Premium
The lesson of the underinclusiveness problem with a market-price
definition of a premium is that, to account for the announcement effect
of the initial investment, the proper measure of a premium is the difference between the market price of the company's stock immediately prior
to disclosure of the potential acquirer's initial acquisition and the repurchase price. 35 Lest this approach seem too easy, however, there are
34. A profit-based definition can also be underinclusive. In the Revenue Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. X, § 10228, Congress seems to have attempted to mitigate the overinclusiveness problem by limiting the application of the section to shareholders who have "made or threatened to make a public tender offer for stock of [the
repurchasing] corporation." The difficulty is that Congress badly overshot the mark,
ending up with a significantly underinclusive definition. Most important, a would-be
greenmailer need hardly make an explicit offer or threat to make an offer in order to get
the point across. At the extreme, if an individual with a reputation as a raider-for example, Boone Pickens or Carl Icahn-announces no more than that he has acquired
10% of a company's stock for investment (although he is also considering other alternatives, including but not limited to acquiring control), no offer has been made or
threatened, but the message that the company may be in play nonetheless has been
delivered. Limiting the section's application to settings in which an offer has been explicitly made or threatened thus leaves the section's definition of greenmail quite underinclusive.
Adding, but less significantly, to the section's underinclusiveness, is its limitation to
situations when a tender offer has been made or threatened. The threat that lends
credence to an exploitive greenmailer is that to incumbent management's control. But
the particular means by which that control is threatened is not important. Thus, there
seems to be little reason to exclude from the ambit of the section shareholders who, for
example, wage or threaten to wage a proxy fight.
A final point concerning section 5881 is the wisdom of dealing with issues of corporate governance through the mechanism of the federal income tax. Here the issue is not
only the subterfuge of treating the matter as one of revenue, but the unfortunate quality
of the work product when the lead drafting committee is without experience in matters
of corporate governance.
35. But see SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985),
in which the court rejected a similar statistical approach to determining the existence of
a premium advanced by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In that case, however, the inquiry into the existence of a premium took place in a very different context.
The court in Carter Hawley Hale held that for purposes of determining whether a corporate stock repurchase was an issuer tender offer under section 13(e)(1) of the Williams
Act, the presence of a premium was determined by reference to a simple market price
measure-the repurchase price less the market price immediately prior to disclosure.
Id. at 951. The court's conclusion in CarterHawley Hale, however, was influenced by the
particular regulatory structure governing issuer tender offers. The terms of Rule 13e- I
contemplate that some issuer repurchases are not tender offers. A statistical approach
to determining the existence of a premium likely would result in all issuer repurchases
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two problems in using the predisclosure price as the basis for determining whether the repurchase price includes a premium, one that may
require retrospective and the other prospective adjustment of the predisclosure price. It may be necessary, in calculating the premium, to
adjust the market price that existed immediately prior to disclosure of
the initial investment to account for the possibility of leakage-in case
information concerning the initial investment influenced market price
prior to its formal disclosure. In turn, it also may be necessary to adjust
the pre-disclosure price to account for post-disclosure movements in
the price of the company's stock due to changes in market conditions.
1. Retrospective Adjustments in the Predisclosure Price. - Determining
the price of the company's stock immediately prior to disclosure of the
potential acquirer's initial investment should not be difficult when the
disclosure is required under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and when there has been no leakage of the information
prior to the filing of the 13D Statement.3 6 But when formal disclosure
under section 13(d) is not required because the initial investment is of
less than five percent of the company's stock, there may not be a precise
announcement date with reference to which the predisclosure price can
be set. Indeed, even when a 13D Statement is filed, leakage may make
it difficult to specify the actual predisclosure price 37 without examining
price movements in the company's stock in the days preceding the formal announcement to determine the market price before it wass3 influenced by information concerning the initial investor's activities.
occurring during a control contest being treated as issuer tender offers, a result arguably
inconsistent with the regulatory pattern.
36. Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(d) (1982), and Rule 13d-l, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1987), require that schedule 13D, disclosing, inter alia, the identity
of the acquirer, the source of its funds, and the purpose of the transaction, be filed
within 10 days after a person has acquired the beneficial ownership of more than five
percent of any class of equity security registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982). See, e.g., R. Gilson, supra note 2, at
936-47. The Proxmire and Sanford bills would reduce the five percent threshold to
three percent and two and one-half percent respectively, and would require filings
within one and two days after the initial investment. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 3a, 133 Cong. Rec. 7601 (1987); S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3a, 133 Cong. Rec.
7668 (1987). If enacted, these provisions would reduce, though not eliminate, the
problems associated with wholly undisclosed initial investments and with leakage.
37. In a related setting, the problem of leakage is significant. A recent study by the
SEC documents that the combination of market speculation and possible insider trading
results in significant price and volume increases in target company stock at least 10 days
prior to the formal announcement of a tender offer. Office of the Chief Economist,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Stock Trading Before the Announcement of
Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation? 3 (Feb. 24, 1987). While the
problem should be much less significant when what is involved is only an initial investment rather than a tender offer, it still must be kept in mind.
38. A standard approach would be to test for abnormal returns in this period. See
infra note 39.

344

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:329

2. ProspectiveAdjustments in the PredisclosurePrice. - After determining the predisclosure market price, the next step is comparing it to the
repurchase price to determine whether a premium was paid. Once
again, however, there is a danger of both over and underinclusiveness.
The overinclusiveness problem arises when the company's stock price
increases between the announcement of the initial investment and the
repurchase in response to general market movements. A repurchase
price that exceeds the predisclosure price only as a result of general
market movements does not include the implicit premium that posed
the problem with the simple market-price measure of a premium.
Thus, the predisclosure price must be adjusted upwards to reflect
postdisclosure general market movements before comparing it to the
repurchase price.
Conversely, the underinclusiveness problem arises when the target
company's stock price decreases between the announcement and the
repurchase in response to general market movements. Though the repurchase price is absolutely lower than the predisclosure price, an
implicit premium still will be present if the predisclosure price, now
reduced to account for postdisclosure general market movements, is
lower than the repurchase price.
Thus, adjusting the predisclosure price of the company's stock
before comparing it to the repurchase price requires the ability to distinguish between price changes due to the investor's intial acquisition
and price changes due to general market movements. Although in
times of stable prices the task is likely to be straightforward enough,
simple visual inspection of price patterns will not suffice in more complex periods when changes in general economic conditions have also
affected stock prices. In these situations, however, developments in the
statistical methodology used by financial economists now provide a
powerful means to distinguish between stock price changes due to new
information concerning the stock, like a potential acquirer's initial in'vestment, and changes that result from general market movements. s9
A direct statistical approach to measuring a premium thus has the
39. Investigations making use of this methodology are commonly referred to as
abnormal return (or prediction error) studies. Briefly, such a study uses either the capital asset pricing model or the market model to predict what a stock's price would have
been, taking into account only changes in general economic conditions. When the stock
does better or worse than predicted, the difference is referred to as a positive or negative abnormal return (or prediction error). When such an abnormal return is found to
coincide with an unanticipated event, like the announcement of a potential acquirer's
initial investment or the repurchase of that investment, it is possible to infer a causal
relationship between the event and the abnormal return. Note in this regard that an
abnormal return is not a measure of whether the stock price went up or down. Rather, it
is a statement of whether the stock went up or down more or less than it should have.
Thus, for example, a stock that goes down less than it should have, given the general
movement in the market, has experienced positive abnormal returns even though the
stock experienced an absolute price decrease. Similarly, a stock that moves up less than it
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promise to satisfy the tasks assigned to the measurement of a premium
in a greenmail prohibition. 40 It offers sufficient precision so as not to
be predictably under or overinclusive itself. As a result, it can serve to
relieve the pressure on the formulation of the substantial amount and
short-term holder components. The costs of their inherent imprecision
are significantly mitigated by the precision of the premium measure.
The statistical approach is not without drawbacks. First, like any
statistical measure, it is not perfect; there is a margin for error.4 1 Second, it requires a small econometric study, a benefit to economic consultants but a transaction cost for the rest of us. Still, if the need for
econometrics is the transaction cost of precision, legal bickering over
under and overinclusiveness (and the beneficial conduct inadvertently
deterred or detrimental conduct inadvertently sanctioned) are the
transaction costs of imprecision. The direct statistical approach, therefore, appears to offer real advantages over existing definitions of a
greenmail premium.
C. A PostrepurchaseMeasure of a Premium
A third approach to measuring the presence of a premium seeks to
provide the precision offered by the direct statistical approach, but
without the econometric cost. It finesses the underinclusiveness/overinclusiveness dilemma by, in effect, harnassing the market to
define greenmail. Recall that the difficulty in defining a premium results from the fact that the market price of the stock repurchased in a
greenmail transaction has a built-in greenmail premium. The first two
approaches responded by looking back to price levels before disclosure
of the repurchase, the profit measure by using the potential acquirer's
cost as a proxy for the predisclosure price and the statistical approach
by retroactively adjusting the market price at the time of disclosure to
reflect the impact of the initial investment. In contrast, the third
approach looks to the market price after the repurchase: repurchases
are prohibited at a price above the market price of the stock a specified
should have, given the general movement in the market, has experienced negative abnormal returns even though it has experienced an absolute price increase.

For discussions of the use of abnormal return methodology in connection with
problems similar to measuring a greenmail premium, see, e.g., R. Gilson, supra note 2,
at 213-38 (1976); Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24
J.L. & Econ. 121 (1981).

40. This approach has been recommended by the Reporters of the American Law
Institute's Corporate Governance Project. See American Law Institute, Principles of
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.04 and Comment c(2)(b)
(Advisory Group Draft No. 9, Sept. 16, 1987). This recommendation has not been considered by the Council or membership of the American Law Institute, and therefore
does not represent the position of the Institute. I am one of the Reporters. The views I

express here, of course, are my own.
41. For a discussion of the interpretive problems in connection with abnormal return studies, see R. Gilson, supra note 2, at 235-38.

346

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:329

period-say three days-after public announcement of the intended re42
purchase transaction.
To see how a postrepurchase measure of a premium distinguishes
greenmail from legitimate repurchase transactions, consider two bodies
of empirical data. First, as already noted, 43 a company's stock price
typically drops immediately on announcement of a repurchase from a
potential acquirer to reflect the reduced likelihood of a takeover. Thus,
by setting as a ceiling on the repurchase price the lower market price
existing after the announcement of repurchase, it is possible to eliminate all the potential profit from a greenmail strategy. To be sure, the
data show that all of the price increase associated with announcement
of the potential acquirer's initial investment is not eliminated by the
announcement of the repurchase. What remains reflects the anticipation of another offer.4 4 Although the target company still can pay the
potential acquirer its proportionate share of this increase under a postrepurchase measure of a premium, the same gain is by definition available to any shareholder simply by selling in the market following the
repurchase announcement. In contrast, parity in the prices available to
the potential acquirer and other shareholders does not exist when, as
with a simple market-price measure of a premium, the potential acquirer gets the pre-repurchase announcement price but other shareholders get only the lower postrepurchase price.
The second body of relevant empirical data concerns the price impact of nongreenmail repurchase transactions. We know that on average stock prices rise slightly following announcement of general
repurchase programs that the market perceives as not involving greenmail. 4 5 The explanation offered for this price reaction is that by repurchasing shares, a company credibly signals that it has private
information indicating that the market price is too low. 46 Thus, legiti42. To my knowledge, this approach was originally suggested by Joseph Grundfest.
To date, it has not been reflected in any proposed federal legislation. At the state level,
California recently almost adopted a greenmail prohibition that followed this tack,
prohibiting repurchase of more than three percent of a company's stock not held for
more than one year at a price in excess of the "post-disclosure market price," defined as
either the market price of the stock three days after disclosure of the intent to make the
repurchase, or the average price over the thirty days following disclosure. California
Senate Bill 542 (Sen. McCorquodale sponsor, 1987). Although passed by both houses
of the California Legislature, the bill was vetoed by Governor Deukmejian on September
19, 1987. For a criticism of the Governor's veto message, see Gilson, Odd Veto of AntiGreenmail Measure, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 12, 1987, at Cl, col. I.
43. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
44. This is consistent with the idea that a benefit of greenmailers is to identify the
opportunity for the rest of the market. See supra note 3.
45. See, e.g., Masulis, Stock Repurchase by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the
Causes of Common Stock Price Changes, 35J. Fin. 305, 316 (1980); Vermaelen, Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signalling: An Empirical Study, 9J. Fin. Econ. 139,
179 (1981).
46. This explanation, in turn, suggests that the issuance of new stock should result
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mate repurchase transactions would not be adversely affected by a postrepurchase measure of a premium because there would be no price
drop as a result of the announcement of a nongreenmail repurchase.
The most intriguing part of this approach is that the solution relies
on the market to identify greenmail. When the market believes that an
announced repurchase involves greenmail, the stock price will drop to
eliminate the greenmailer's built-in gain. When the market does not
believe the repurchase involves greenmail, the stock price will not be
adversely affected.
This reliance on a market determination of greenmail to eliminate
a premium has a number of interesting advantages. First, the approach
avoids the underinclusive/overinclusive dilemma because the market
makes an individualized determination of whether a premium exists in
every case. When it concludes that the market price prior to announcement of the intent to repurchase incorporated a premium based on anticipation that the potential acquirer would make an offer, the price
drops to eliminate the premium. In this sense, the approach is less a
rule, with a rule-like bias in favor of ease of application at the expense
of an individualized determination in each case,4 7than a standard where
the focus is on the facts of the particular case.
The second advantage flows from the first. Typically, an important
part of the cost of the individualized inquiry associated with a standard
is the cost of the inquiry itself. Because the rule/standard debate generally assumes that the decisionmaker will be a court, the open-ended
flexibility of a standard imposes additional litigation expenses as com48
Because a marpared to an easily (if not mechanically) applied rule.

ket determination of the existence of a premium and its resulting
elimination if one is found is essentially self-executing, there are almost
no administrative costs associated with this approach.
Finally, because both the determination of whether a premium exists and, if so, of the remedy in effect imposed, is precise, a market
determination approach succeeds in taking the pressure off the formulation of the substantial amount and short-term holder components of
the greenmail prohibition. The difficulty presented by both components is that if underinclusiveness is avoided by specifying a size of
purchase trigger low enough, and holding period short enough, that no
greenmail purchases will slip through, the net may also catch some
in a comparable decline in the value of already outstanding stock because the sale signals that the company believes the presale stock price was too high. The data are con-

sistent with this conclusion as well. See Ascquith & Mullins, Equity Issues and Offering

Dilution, 15J. Fin. Econ. 61, 65 (1986); Mikkelson & Partch, Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15J. Fin. Econ. 31, 44 (1986); Schipper & Smith,
A Comparison of Equity Carve-Outs and Equity Offerings: Share Price Effects and Corporate Restructurings, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 153, 155 (1986).
47. See M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 15-63 (1987).

48. The most familiar criticism of this advantage of a rule formulation in other contexts is that the ease of application is a myth. Id.
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nongreenmail transactions that are not intended to be prohibited. The
market determination approach solves this problem because even if the
size of purchase or holding period requirements unintentionally cover
a nongreenmail transaction in a particular case, the market determination of the existence of a premium nonetheless will effectively exempt
the transaction from the prohibition. Because the market will recognize that the transaction is not greenmail, the stock price will not drop
following announcement of the repurchase and the prohibition will
have no effect on the terms of the transaction; the price three days later
will not have been altered as a result of the announcement.
One might respond to this analysis by arguing that the post-repurchase measure of a premium is not costless to a seller inadvertently
included in the broadened net of the nonpremium components of a
prohibition that this approach allows. This approach does not distinguish between declines during the three-day postannouncement waiting period caused by general market movements and declines that
occur in response to greenmailing; it would prohibit transactions in
both cases. Hence, the seller must bear the risk that the market price
will drop as a result of general market movements during the three-day
postannouncement waiting period, and should that occur, that the
transaction then could be completed only at the lower price. In fact,
however, the parties could easily negotiate arrangements to reallocate
this risk.
First, the seller could insist that its obligation to close the repurchase transaction be conditioned on the absence of a drop in stock
price. Thus, there would be no risk that the seller would be forced to
complete the sale at a different price than anticipated. That still would
leave the risk that the transaction would go uncompleted, with both
sides losing the benefit of their bargain, if the stock price dropped during the three-day post-transaction period because of general market
movements. However, even this risk can be eliminated through the use
of options on market indices, thereby leaving the seller hedged with
respect to a stock price drop due to general market movements. 4 9
49. There would be a cost to acquiring the options; however, it will always be a
small fraction of the value of a transaction of the size that meets the substantial amount
trigger.
It is also possible that the stock will drop during the three-day period because of
new unfavorable firm-specific information. Where this information was known to the
repurchasing company at the time of the repurchase agreement (that is, before the
three-day post-announcement period), standard common-law and securities fraud remedies provide protection if the seller suffers damages as a result of not completing the
transaction. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The cost of the market determination approach that is
more difficult to eliminate is the seller's loss of the benefit of his bargain when new
company-specific information arises during the three-day period and the company had
no prior knowledge of it, such as the unexpected loss of a major contract or customer.
Even in these cases, however, one can imagine hedging strategies that may mitigate the
problem. If there is an option market in the company's stock, the seller may hedge
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Thus, examining the postrepurchase behavior of a company's share
price appears to offer an accurate and inexpensive way to identify and
prohibit the payment of greenmail premiums. 50
III.

OVERCOMING OBJECTIONS TO A STATUTORY APPROACH

The development of a number of solutions to the problems of
drafting a workable greenmail prohibition does not exhaust the technical objections to proposed formulations, including the three discussed.
One objection-that any prohibition can be avoided by clever lawyers
and investment bankers-expresses skepticism that a prohibition can
be effective regardless of how artfully drawn. A second objection-that
some companies voluntarily have adopted prohibitions on greenmail
while others have not demonstrates that no legislative action is called
for-expresses a preference for a private ordering solution.
A. The Clever Lawyer and Investment Banker Objection:
Devising Greenmail Equivalents
A familiar objection to proposals to prohibit greenmail is that
clever lawyers or investment bankers will devise ways to accomplish the
prohibited result-paying a potential acquirer a premium to go awaythat will fall outside the boundaries of the prohibition regardless of
how the prohibition is formulated. In other words, the objection is
that any prohibition inevitably will be underinclusive. For example,
Chesebrough-Pond recently repurchased Carl Icahn's five percent
holding at market price, but augmented the implicit premium represented by this inflated market price by also purchasing an Icahn-owned
company at a price regarded as substantially above its fair market
value. 51 Indeed, the concept can be extended to eliminate the target
company's repurchase entirely by recasting the transaction so that the
potential acquirer sells his shares on the market simultaneously with
the closing of the advantageously priced side transaction. One can
even eliminate completely any sale of the potential acquirer's stock simply by coupling the favorable side transaction with a standstill agreeagainst price drops due to both general market movements and new company-specific
information by purchasing a put option on the company's stock following disclosure of

the repurchase (although if the repurchase is too large, this approach may still leave a
"deductible" in the insurance provided by the purchase of puts). If there is not an op-

tion market, other hedging techniques may provide some protection against firm-specific events. For example, to the extent that any unfavorable company-specific
information would affect the repurchasing company's competitive position, a hedging

investment in the company's competitors may provide some protection.
50. In this setting, the information on which the market operates is widely distributed and of low cost. Thus, the market can be expected to reflect the information
quickly and accurately. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 U. Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).
51. SeeJaenicke, supra note 6, at B-11.
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ment. 5 2 If merely restructuring the form of the greenmail transaction
serves to avoid the prohibition, the objection goes, the game simply is
not worth the candle.
The problem posed by the clever lawyer and investment banker
objection is endemic to business law. The boundaries of most regulatory systems are expressed by reference to transactional form: such
regulation by its terms applies only to transactions that have a specified
structure. 5 3 But the drawing of the regulation is only the first move in a
multi-round strategic game. 5 4 The objects of the regulation then get
the next move. And so long as the form of the transaction can be altered without significantly altering either the transaction's cash flow or
the associated risk, a vast number of transactional permutations are
available that maintain the substance of the transaction while causing
its form to fall outside the boundaries of the regulation. In the game's
next round, courts determine whether to respect the form in which the
parties have cast their transaction or to draw upon a doctrine, like the
de facto merger doctrine in corporate law 5 5 or the form versus substance and step transaction doctrines in tax law, 56 that looks past the
formal terms of the transaction to its substance.
The same response is available to courts if confronted with efforts
to create greenmail equivalents that fall outside the terms of the prohibition. The substance of a greenmail transaction is far less malleable
than its form. To satisfy the requirements of both the potential acquirer and the target company, the transaction, whatever its form, must
both provide the potential acquirer a premium and restrict his ability
subsequently to mount a control contest. However many permutations
in which the form of the transaction may be cast, these elements of
substance cannot be altered without significantly changing what the
52. The standstill agreement, inter alia, would give the company a right of first
refusal to purchase the shares, a prohibition on further acquisitions or other efforts to
affect control of the company, and an obligation at least to vote the shares in the same
proportion as all other shares are voted (or, more aggressively, as management directs).
See, e.g., Bartlett & Andrews, The Standstill Agreement: Legal and Business Considerations Underlying a Corporate Peace Treaty, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 143 (1982); Note, The
Standstill Agreement: A Case of Illegal Vote Selling and a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 93
Yale L.J. 1093, 1094-95 (1984).
53. For example, both the Internal Revenue Code and many corporation statutes
treat acquisitions that take the form of a statutory merger dramatically differently than
an acquisition that takes the form of an asset acquisition, even though in substance they
are virtually identical. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1982) and I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(C)
(1982); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262 (1983).
54. This view of the regulation of business activities is developed in Gilson, Value
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239, 296-98
(1984).
55. See R. Gilson, supra note 2, at 533-80.
56. See, e.g., Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 Yale LJ. 440 (1968); Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent Developments in the StepTransaction Doctrine, 60 Taxes 970 (1982).
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transaction accomplishes. Indeed, because the substance of both the
transaction and the prohibition is clear, the courts should have an easier time identifying greenmail equivalent transactions than they do in
been developed to back up forother areas where judicial doctrine has
57
mally expressed regulatory systems.
B. The Private Ordering Objection: Companies Can Act of Their Own
The second objection challenges the need for any legislation at all.
Between January 1984 and February 1987, some seventy publicly
traded companies voluntarily adopted greenmail prohibitions by charter amendment. 58 If companies are free to prohibit greenmail on their
own, and if some companies do so while others do not, the implication
is that a greenmail prohibition is not uniformly desirable. If that is the
case, the objection goes, there is no justification for imposing a uniform
legislative prohibition on all companies.
The proper response to this private ordering objection is not that
legislation is preferable to private ordering, but that, in this context,
legislation is necessary to facilitate private ordering. Recall that one of
the two concerns supporting the consensus in favor of prohibiting
greenmail is a fear of management entrenchment. To this, add the
problem of management control of the agenda. As a general rule, the
board of directors must approve any amendment to the company's articles of incorporation, including one prohibiting greenmail. 59 Thus,
unless management offers them the opportunity, shareholders cannot
prohibit greenmail. When one of the points of a greenmail prohibition
is to prevent management from entrenching itself, one can have little
confidence in the outcome of a private ordering process that gives management the power to veto a prohibition.
Put somewhat differently, the objection is driven by the fact that
some companies have not voluntarily prohibited greenmail. But this
outcome does not necessarily mean that a prohibition would not be
desirable. The failure to prohibit greenmail is explainable either by
management's good faith determination that a prohibition would not
serve shareholder interests or by management's bad faith desire to retain this entrenchment tool.
In contrast to the limited role for shareholders in a purely private
ordering process, legislation establishing a greenmail prohibition as the
57. For an application of this approach to other regulatory systems, see R. Gilson,
supra note 2, at 533-80 (de facto merger doctrine); Gilson, Scholes & Wolfson, Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax Motivated
Acquisitions, in Knights, Raiders and Targets: The Impact of Hostile Takeovers (J.
Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds., forthcoming Oxford University Press,
1988) (income taxation of acquisitions).
58. Jaenicke, supra note 6, at B-12.

59. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 905 (West 1977); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 242
(1983); Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 10.03 (1984).
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default rule serves to effectuate the goal of private ordering-allowing
individual companies to vary the rule governing greenmail to meet
their individual circumstances-by assuring that the outcome of private
ordering actually reflects shareholder preferences. All formulations of
a prohibition currently contemplate that greenmail can be paid if shareholders approve it. Thus, where management believes it desirable to
repurchase the stock of a potential acquirer, the prohibition does not
prevent the repurchase; it only requires shareholder approval. With
this statutory structure, management's costless access to the company's
proxy machinery facilitates putting the matter to the shareholders, and
the requirement of shareholder approval acts as a check on the use of
repurchases as a means of entrenchment. 60 So understood, a legislatively imposed greenmail prohibition is not inconsistent with a preference for private ordering. Rather, it functions to create a
decisionmaking structure within the corporation that more effectively
assures a private ordering role for shareholders.
CONCLUSION

In this essay, I have shown that the most familiar formulation of
the prohibition on greenmail-focusing on repurchases above market
price-serves not to prohibit greenmail, but to legalize it by creating a
safe harbor within which it safely can be paid. I then surveyed three
alternative formulations which solve this problem with differing levels
of success. Identifying premiums by measuring sellers' profits is
straightforward, yet has the potential to prohibit many legitimate stock
purchases. Direct statistical measurements can distinguish greenmail
premiums from price changes reflective of general market trends,
though at the cost of introducing econometric modeling into regulatory
enforcement. A still more promising approach is to identify greenmail
as those repurchases that provoke declines in a stock's market price,
60. A different private-ordering issue is whether shareholders could elect to opt out
of the statutory prohibition entirely should they believe that their company would be
better off if management had the discretion to pay greenmail without the need for specific shareholder authorization for each repurchase. The general issue of limits on
shareholders' ability to adopt corporate governance rules that differ from the governing
statute is beside the point because the analysis and result is precisely the same whether
the issue is approving a particular repurchase or opting out of the prohibition entirely.
A private ordering solution is enhanced when, as put by the Reporters of the American
Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, "in corporate law the default rule should
favor the party with less effective access to the proxy process." American Law Institute,
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 152 (Advisory
Group Draft No. 8, Mar. 10, 1987). For a discussion of the issues posed in defining the
boundaries of permissible opting out of rules specified in the corporate statute, see J.
Coffee, Theories of the Corporation and the Problem of Remedies: What Role for Private Ordering? (Columbia University Law School Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 27,
Apr. 1987).
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recognizing the end of a prospective takeover. This allows for case-bycase evaluation by the market of the presence of greenmail.
Each of these approaches, moreover, would withstand attempts at
evasion, for courts would have little trouble identifying the substance of
a greenmail transaction. Finally, a statutory prohibition would enhance
private ordering by ensuring that shareholders have the final say in all
such transactions. Thus, properly drafted, a statute prohibiting greenmail can curb both exploitation and management entrenchment, meeting the concerns of both sides in the continuing debate over corporate
takeovers.
More generally, the problem with the market price formulation results from the fact that its drafters did not understand the underlying
financial economics of the transaction they sought to regulate. Over
the last few years, a large body of empirical studies have been conducted on the operation of the market for corporate control and on the
consequences of particular activities that affect control contests. This is
an extraordinary change from the state of affairs ten years ago when
lawyers debated the effects of different actions and alternative regulatory responses based only on what might be styled a lawyer's definition
of data: the plural of anecdote. The lesson from this is straightforward. We cannot regulate-indeed, to avoid putting the cart before the
horse, we cannot even determine whether regulation is appropriate-if
we do not understand the underlying substance of the activity that concerns us. 6 ' Where that activity is part of the capital market, the task
calls for the cooperation of lawyers and financial economists. Neither
group is likely to do an acceptable job on its own.
61. This theme is developed in detail in Gilson, supra note 2.

